In January 2012, the Supreme Court held in Maples v. Thomas that an Alabama death row inmate, Cory R. Maples, should not have been punished for missing a crucial post-conviction appeal deadline as a result of his attorneys’ ineffective representation. On its face, the ruling appears just; it would be illogical to expect a client to account for his attorneys’ every action, especially when, as here, the attorneys are representing that client pro bono. Yet by itself, the decision obscures the gross injustice of the underlying situation, the mistakes throughout which should provide a cautionary tale for both attorneys and justice systems alike.

Following a 1997 trial in which Maples was convicted of murdering two people, the jury voted 10 to 2 to recommend the death penalty—the minimum number of votes required for the death penalty under Alabama law. Because Alabama is the only state to not guarantee representation in post-conviction proceedings to those capital inmates who cannot otherwise afford it, Maples was represented pro bono by two associates from the New York office of the prestigious law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, and a local Alabama attorney, who acted as Maples’ attorney “in name only.” Those attorneys, after filing a post-conviction petition in state court in August 2001, both left Sullivan & Cromwell in 2002, to positions that precluded their further working on the case, yet they did not inform the court (in which the petition was still pending) their client of their departures.

When, in May 2003, the petition was denied, a clerk for the state court sent two copies to the Sullivan & Cromwell New York office, and one to the Alabama attorney. However, since the attorneys previously handling the case no longer worked for Sullivan & Cromwell, the firm’s mailroom sent the rulings back to the court unopened, and the Alabama attorney apparently did not even attempt to reach out to his client or New York co-counsel. The court made no further attempt to contact either Maples or any of his attorneys. As a result, when Maples himself finally learned of the adverse ruling, his time to appeal had already passed—through no fault, of course of his own. After a new set of Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys finally appealed on behalf of Maples, both the Alabama federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit denied his appeal, reasoning that, in effect, Maples should bear the burden of the procedural errors committed by others.

The procedural improprieties and seemingly obvious mistakes here raise multiple questions for different parties. First, should courts have a greater responsibility in reaching out to a client himself when counsel is unresponsive, given the potential consequences of a particular ruling? And second, how can attorneys so flagrantly ignore their ethical and professional responsibilities to a client? Unfortunately, the opinion still remains—even, it seems, among some of the current Supreme Court Justices—that the “client bears the risk of all attorney errors.” The ruling here—though not applicable to every client who is inadequately represented in a case of such importance—is certainly a step in the right direction, away from a philosophy that does not do enough to hold attorneys accountable for their errors.